The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a State set out in the provisions of the present part are subject, as appropriate, to the provisions and procedures of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.
This seemingly innocuous provision is not only obscure, for its consequences are unclear, but it may in the event by singularly ill-founded. Broadly speaking, there are two possible situations: a Security Council decision is either irrebuttable, or rebuttable. The merits, or demerits, of these alternatives need to be examined separately.
L The Two Possible Views of the Effect of Security Council Decisions

A. Security Council Decisions are Conclusive and Irrebuttable as Regards the Measures Approved or Condemned by Those Decisions
This 'solution' has its attractions. Certainly in the domain of international peace and security the Council has been endowed with 'primary responsibility* (Article 24<1) of the Charter) and all members agree to 'accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council...' (Article 25). It would be difficult for the Council to discharge its responsibilities if members were free to challenge those decisions and decline to implement them. Moreover, in the kind of situation covered by Chapter VII, and in which binding decisions are made, it is unlikely that there will be time for suspension of compliance whilst verification of the correctness of the Council's decision is made by some third party: speed of compliance may be essential.
On the other hand, the solution has some decidedly unattractive features. A Member State is entitled to assume that in taking any decision the Security Council will uphold international law and safeguard the legal rights of States. 5 The Preamble to the Charter recited the intention 'to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained'. Article 1(1) states the purpose of settling disputes 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law', and Article 24(2) commits the Council to discharging its duties in accordance with that purpose. In Article 36(3) the Council is exhorted to encourage States to refer legal disputes to the Court, so that the clear implication is that legal disputes are not the business of the Council. Indeed, the power to order provisional measures under Article 40 is 'without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned'. And the obligation of members to accept the Council's decisions under Article 25 is limited to decisions 'in accordance with the present Charter'.
In practice, however, the apparent expectation that the Council will function under the Rule of Law is not reinforced by the normal legal safeguards one would expect to find surrounding the exercise of executive powers in a democratic, constitutional system. 6 There is no judicial review of Council decisions and no provision for third-party settlement of disputes between the Council and a member. The Council could agree to arbitration with a member, but has never yet done so, and even the power to request an Advisory opinion has been used only once 7 by the Council in nearly fifty years. The kind of recourse to a Commission of Jurists, which was seen in the days of die League of Nations 8 has never been used by the Security Council. Even more disturbing, the Council frequently fails to indicate the constitutional basis -i.e. the Charter provision -on which it acts, and discussions of legal rights or constitutionality are becoming more and more rare.
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In these circumstances, therefore, it would be surprising if members were to agree that any Council decision is conclusive as to that member's legal rights. Nor are the objections listed above met by simply asserting that the Council is a political -not a judicial -body. That is no doubt true. All the more reason, therefore, why it should not be assumed that the Council disposes of questions of legal right with finality.
This line of reasoning faces the difficulty that, in the Lockerbie case, 10 the ICJ took a different view. The Court said:
Whereas both Libya and the United States, as Members of the United Nations, are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; -whereas the Court... considers that prima facie this obligation extends to the decision contained in resolution 748 (1992); and whereas, in accordance they may not create totally new obligations that have no basis in the Charter, for the Council is an executive organ, not a legislature. In short, the Council does not have a blank cheque.
To take an extreme example, it is possible that the surest way to restore international peace and security, in a situation created by the aggression of a powerful State A, would be for the Council to agree that A should have what it covets, namely part of the territory of a weaker State B. But could the Council decide, with binding effect, that B must transfer the territory to A in the interests of restoring peace? Instinctively, one would reply in the negative, and, clearly, the simple recital of the binding effect of Council decisions under Article 25 would provide no kind of satisfactory answer.
B. Security Council Decisions are prima facie to be Presumed Valid and Binding, but their Binding Force may be Rebutted on Proof that they are ultra vires or Contrary to the UN Charter
There is some judicial support for the view that the acts of the Council enjoy only a prima facie validity, a presumption of legality that can be challenged in the final analysis. In the Expenses case 15 the Court said;
.... when the Organisation takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organisation. 748 (1992) there is some evidence that, at the merits stage, the Court might reserve the right to question its validity.
It is important that this position should be maintained, and that the Court -or for that matter any other competent judicial body -should not regard itself as precluded from questioning the validity of a Council resolution in so far as it affects the legal rights of States. If this is right, two questions arise: on what grounds would review be proper and by whom should the review be marie? 
n. The Potential Grounds for Review
Given that no review has ever taken place, discussion of the grounds for review must be based on principle rather than practice.
A. Grounds to be Excluded
Differences of Political Judgment
It would, in principle, be quite wrong to allow any Court to question matters of political judgment. 18 In particular, it would be wrong to allow any court to question the Council's judgment that a Chapter VII situation -a 'threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression' -either had, or had not, occurred. Equally the Council's discretion over the choice of means to deal with the situation, for example, whether to order provisional measures under Article 40, or economic sanctions under Article 41, or to institute measures of peacekeeping, must be preserved as not subject to judicial challenge. The same would be true of decisions as to the timing of, or participation in, such measures.
There is, in fact, a long tradition in most legal systems of judicial abstention in 'political questions', and the International Court itself has recognized that there are inherent limitations on the judicial function.
19 It would be quite wrong for any Court to substitute its own political judgment for that of the Security Council. But the allocation of legal responsibility to a particular State is a different matter and in recent times has figured quite prominently in Council decisions. 20 Where the Council decides under Article 39 that Chapter VII applies, and in addition decides that State X is guilty of aggression, or must pay compensation, the latter finding is not simply a matter of political judgment It is a finding based upon an assessment of the facts and the application of a norm of international law, based on that assessment of the facts. So, too, where the Council decides that Member States must apply economic sanctions against State X because of its violation of the right of
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There is DO suggestion in the Chatter that a finding of illegality is a pre-condition for the application of Chapter VIL In the majority of cases the findings of the self-determination. The obligation to apply sanctions arises because of the delict by State X, and a finding of delict is not a purely political decision: it is a finding of fact and law.
Evidence of Bias
Whilst bias may disqualify a judge, or a person acting quasi-judicially, it would be totally inappropriate to apply this as a ground for review o£ Security Council decisions. States are political institutions, not judges, and their 'bias' against States of quite different political persuasions is an accepted fact of life. It would be impossible to compose any UN political organ free of such 'bias'. Moreover, it has to be assumed that, acting collegiately, the Council members allow for, and take account of, any such bias in the weight they attach to the views of individual States. There is no place for a later judicial scrutiny on this ground.
Procedural Irregularities
Here, too, the Council must be accepted as the master of its own procedures. It has its Rules of Procedure, and its own means of challenge to any alleged procedural irregularity.
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B. Grounds to be Included as Valid Grounds of Challenge
Ultra vires
As indicated above, there is no reason to suppose that a decision is binding on a Member State when that decision is ultra vires, precisely because States have under Article 25 agreed to accept only such decisions as are in conformity with the Charter. So a decision taken in violation of the Charter should not be held to be binding. As Bedjaoui says:
Si 1'organc ne respecte pas la Charte et specialement i'6conomic interne' dê 'Organisation, c'est-a-dire la repartition interne des competences des organes, il est manifeste que sa decision est prise ultra vires et doit 8tre tenue pour irre'guliere... Cette obligation de respecter un instrument est juridiquement indipendante de l'existence d'un organe de contr61e.22
There can be no basis for arguing that, as a political organ, the Council is not subject to the ultra vires doctrine. Member States have every right to insist that the Council keeps within the powers diey have accorded to it under the Charter. As the
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In fact, in the Namibia case supra note 7, at paras. 20-22 the Court gave a substantive response to South Africa's contention that SC Res. 284 (1970) wu procedurally invalid because of the abstention of two permanent members. 22
Bedjaoui, supra note 5, at 92-93.
International Court declared in its Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission to the United Nations:
The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment."
Thus, the Council could not make a mandatory decision, binding on all members, to impose economic sanctions without a prior determination of a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression'. The Council could not decide that States must submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ -for Chapter VI confers only powers of recommendation. And the Council could not order a State to transfer any part of its own territory to another, for no such power exists in the Charter.
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A view recently expressed 25 is that, since the Council acts by delegation of powers from the membership as a whole, it cannot delegate those powers to a State or group of States (delegatus non potest delegare ). In short, although die Council can utilize a State or States as its agent, subject to direction and control, it would be ultra vires to confer total discretion to a State or States to act on behalf of the Council. The view was expressed by way of criticism of Resolution 794, by which the Council authorized the United States and others to use 'all necessary means' to establish conditions of security for humanitarian operations in Somalia. Certainly without continuing close scrutiny by the Council, such delegation of power might be questionable.
Denial of a Right to a Hearing
The Charter provisions in Articles 31, 32 and 44 do not, expressis verbis, confer on a Member State the right to be heard before sanctions are imposed upon it 26 and the maxim audi alterant partem is invoked in connection with judicial or quasi-judicial hearings, rather than hearings in a political organ.
Nevertheless it would seem extraordinary if die Council were able to make a finding of legal responsibility against a State, and perhaps impose sanctions, without offering that State an opportunity of being heard. 
The Decision is Manifestly Defective
As already indicated, the defect would have to be more than procedural. But where a decision affects a State's legal rights or responsibilities, and can be shown to be unsupported by the facts, or based upon a quite erroneous view of the facts, 27 or a clear error of law, the decision ought in principle to be set aside.
m. The Fora Within Which a Review or Challenge Might be Made
If one takes the view that the current problem has its genesis in the ending of the Cold War, and the consequent disappearance of the checks and balances inherent in East-West rivalry, then it is possible to see the solution in the provision of some new political forum, or machinery, to provide substitute political checks and balances. Thus Reisman advocates a greater involvement of the General Assembly which, being advised of prospective Council action under Chapter VII, would activate a new 'Chapter VII Consultation Committee'.
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But there is no guarantee that the legal rights of a particular Member State will be protected by the General Assembly, for the Assembly remains a highly political body, with its own political agenda, and there have been periods when 'unpopular' States -Portugal, South Africa, and perhaps now Iraq and Libya -could not, with absolute confidence, look to the Assembly as the guardian of legality. Moreover, the general, constitutional experience has been to see the protection of legal rights, and the Rule of Law, as best allocated to judicial rather than political bodies.
Turning to judicial or arbitral bodies, the possibilities are both actual and potential.
A. The International Court of Justice
It is self-evident that the Court has no direct role as an organ of judicial review. As the Court noted in the Expenses case:
In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for determining the validity of even a legislative or governmental act, but no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the United Nations.
"
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Not infrequently the Council acts on ttte basis of partial information, provided by one or two Member States, or acts quickly before the facts can be objectively established. This may be inevitable, but then this is precisely the situation for which Article 40 was designed, and the Council's actions ought to be without prejudice to the rights of the parties. 28
Reisman, supra note 9, at 98-99. 29
Supra note IS. It may be noted that Clark and Soon, World Peace through World Law (1958) at 44 (in discussing proposed Article 96 of the Charter) suggested such a power should be given to the Court However, there are two means whereby the Court can currently pronounce on the legality of resolutions of any UN organ.
Pronouncements Incidental to an Inter-State Dispute
Situations do arise in which, as part of a more general dispute between States, the parties dispute the legality or effect of resolutions of UN organs. 30 In the context of the Special Rapporteur's proposed Part IH on peaceful settlement, and assuming a dispute over the legality of counter-measures came before an arbitral tribunal or the ICJ, this situation could certainly occur. If one party relied on a resolution of the Security Council to prove either that a delict had been committed by the other, or that counter-measures had been authorized by the Council against the other, it would be open to the other party to contest the validity of the Council's resolution.
The drawbacks to this incidental competence of the Court are several. It would depend upon both parties accepting the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal or the Court, whether via Part HI or some other instrument It would also be limited by the fact that any award or judgment would be inter panes, 31 confined, in effect, to the proposition that the one party could not oppose the resolution to the other, it would not quash or condemn the resolution for all purposes.
Finally, it cannot be predicted with any confidence that the Court would tackle the fundamental issue of the legality or validity of the resolution. Certainly it has not so far categorically refused to do so, but equally we have no actual example of the Court ever having done so. Thus, as a direct means of challenge its utility is questionable.
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By Means of an Advisory Opinion
The possibilities for a much wider use of the advisory opinion as a means of challenging the validity of decisions of the Council have already been explored in detail by Judge Bedjaoui, 33 so they require no repetition here. principle, the opinion, once given, is not binding. The risks of the State which has sought the opinion taking that view are perhaps slight, but the risks are real enough where the Council is concerned (the Expenses case readily comes to mind) unless the Council has committed itself in advance to accept the opinion as binding.
As to speed, which may be of the essence where Chapter VII is concerned, Judge Bcdjaoui suggests that an opinion within two weeks is possible. 34 That may be so, but it is unlikely if Member States or the Secretary-General are to be invited to submit their views to the Court So it may be more practicable-to assume a longer time will be needed, and allow for the resolution under challenge to continue to operate in the meanwhile, but subject to an obligation to make reparation if the challenge is upheld. 
By Reference to an Arbitral Tribunal or Commission of Jurists
A totally new solution would be for the UN to establish an Arbitral Tribunal, or even a Commission of Jurists, to act as a kind of 'constitutional Court' in the sense that it would be a standing body to which, whenever a decision was challenged by a State, the Council would refer the challenge. Ideally, the Council should be committed in advance to accept any report from such a Commission of Jurists.
The issue of timing is difficult and inescapable, but it is unthinkable that the Council would agree to suspend the implementation of a decision under Chapter VH pending an award or final report In principle, however, the alternative should be either, (i) the Council would suspend the implementation of the decision pending the award or report, or (ii) the Council would have the right to insist on continued compliance with its decision, but subject to an obligation to pay compensation for injury caused by any invalid decision.
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The likelihood of the Security Council accepting such a new solution must be extremely low. The present mood of the Council seems to indicate an impatience with legal restraints, rather than a willingness to create them. Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that verbal support for the Rule of Law, coupled with a refusal to accept any real legal control over executive decisions, is not a consistent position in an age pledged to uphold democratic values. 
